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1995]
KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORP. V. CATELLUS
DEVELOPMENT CORP.: BROAD REMEDIAL POWERS
OF CERCLA TAKE NO PRISONERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development
Corp.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a contractor who excavated and graded vacant land could
be a potentially responsible person 2 ("PRP") under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA"). 3 The contractor, while excavating and grading a development site, unknowingly spread contaminated soil
4
from one area of a property to areas throughout the property.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the contractor could be held liable for
damages under section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA as an operator of a
facility at which hazardous substances were disposed and under sec5
tion 107(a) (4) of CERCLA as a transporter of hazardous wastes.
Congress enacted CERCLA to protect the public and the environment from the dangers posed by hazardous waste sites. 6 To
1. 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV

1992), defines a "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." CERCLA § 101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).

For a description of potentially responsible persons ("PRPs"), see infra note 11
and accompanying text.
3. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1343.
4. Id. at 1339-40.
5. Id. at 1343. The holding in Kaiser is congruous with a commentator's assertion that "[t]he present array of environmental laws and regulations makes it increasingly likely that environmental hazards and liability can entangle the
unsuspecting contractor, even on the simplest of projects." Robert C. Chambers,
EnvironmentalDevelopments, in 1993 WILEY CONSTRUCTION LAW UPDATE § 4.2 (Overton A. Currie & Neal J. Sweeney eds., 1993).
For a further discussion of the facts and holding of Kaiser, see infra notes 78108 and accompanying text.
6. United States v. BASF-Inmont Corp., 819 F. Supp. 601, 606 (ED. Mich.
1993) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120). More specifically, Congress enacted CERCLA "because
existing law ... was inadequate for dealing with the problem of hazardous waste
sites." United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1258 (S.D. Ill.
1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120).
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achieve this significant goal, CERCLA authorizes the establishment
of a 1.6 billion dollar trust fund, known as "Superfund."7 The
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") expends
this trust fund to cleanup and contain hazardous waste sites., EPA
may seek reimbursement of the response 9 costs it incurs for
cleanup and containment from PRPs. t0 PRPs are members of one
or more of the four enumerated groups upon which CERCLA permits response costs to be imposed: owners, operators, generators,
and transporters." PRPs may, in turn, seek contribution from

7. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507.
8. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20).
9. CERCLA defines "respond" or "response" to mean "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto." CERCLA § 101 (24),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
10. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 805 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20).
11. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 107(a) of CERCLA provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
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other PRPs for the others' share of the total response costs ex12
pended in performing the cleanup.
Permitting PRPs to seek contribution from other PRPs furthers
Congress' goal of ensuring that those persons responsible for damages associated with hazardous waste sites bear the costs of cleaning
up the sites.' 3 A steady judicial expansion of persons qualifying
as PRPs has also furthered Congress' goal.1 4 For example, courts
have extended operator liability to the corporate parents of subsidiaries, 1 5 lessees,1 6 governmental bodies and agencies, 17 and corpo12. Id. § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §9613(0(1). Section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA
provides as follows:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under... section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims
shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring
an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under ... section 9607 of this title.
Id.

13. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982). The Reilly Tar court concluded that CERCLA "should not be narrowly interpreted to . . . limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs
beyond the limits expressly provided." Id.
14. For examples of the steady judicial expansion of persons qualifying as
PRPs, see infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (liability based on fact that parent hired certain corporate officers of subsidiary as well as on other relevant considerations); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (liability based on, inter alia, parent's familiarity with
waste disposal practices, capacity to control decisions and limits placed on pollution control expenditures of subsidiary).
16. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Md.
1991) (lessee former operator of wood treatment facility held to be PRP); United
States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987)(lessee
metal plating company liable as operator of facility), aff 'd sub nom. United States v.
R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
But see Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.) (mere
access to leaking underground storage tanks insufficient to hold prior tenant liable), cert. denied sub nom., Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
17. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (departments, agencies and instrumentalities of federal government), aff'd, 10 F.3d 1987 (3d Cir. 1993), and adhered to, 38 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1889 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725
(W.D. Wash. 1991)(Environmental Protection Agency); Shapiro v. Alexanderson,
741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y.) (Putnam County, New York), reh'g denied, 743 F. Supp.
268 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Freeman, 680 F. Supp. 73 (W.D.N.Y.
1988) (State of New York). But see United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144
(4th Cir. 1988)(complaint against state department of health and environment
dismissed because "series of regulatory actions" was held not to qualify agency as
operator of site).
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rate officials."' In addition, courts have extended transporter
liability to include persons who selected the sites where hazardous
wastes were taken 1 9 as well as persons who actually participated in
20
transporting the hazardous wastes.
This Note first maintains that courts, for the most part, correctly interpret CERCLA's remedial goals so as to broaden the
scope of persons qualifying as PRPs. This Note then discusses and

analyzes the Ninth Circuit's holding in Kaiser, focusing on the
court's exorbitant use of CERCLA's remedial goals. Next, this Note
discusses the limited alternatives available to contractors to avoid
liability under CERCLA following the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Kaiser. Finally, this Note demonstrates that the holding in Kaiser
will do little to achieve Congress' goals in enacting CERCLA: protecting the public and the environment from the dangers posed by
hazardous waste sites.

18. See, e.g., United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.
1992) (owner/president of waste oil company held liable); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985)(founder, chief executive
officer and majority shareholder held personally liable). But see Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Mich. 1991)(individual in
operational control of facility held not liable as no nexus existed between operational control and decision to dispose of wastes).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (party cannot be liable as transporter unless it selected disposal
site); United States v. Parsons, 723 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (person who
agreed to help dispose of wastes and who financed rental of disposal trucks liable);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (transporter who selected site held strictly liable), aff 'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987). But see Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 912 (D.
Mass. 1992)(court failed to mention issue of disposal site selection when it imposed liability on person who admitted transporting wastes to site).
20. See, e.g., Blackstone Valley Elec., 808 F. Supp. at 912; Parsons, 723 F. Supp. at
757. But see Danella Southwest, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 775 F. Supp.
1227 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (person who disposed of contaminated soil is PRP but not
liable due to equitable factors), aff'd without op., 978 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1992).
For a discussion of the facts and holding of Danella, see infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
Courts have also extended the scope of generator liability. However, a discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this Note and will not be addressed. For a
discussion of the judicial expansion of generator liability, see generally Meigan
Flood Cooper, Note, Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc.: The Bottomless Pit of CERCLA Generator Liability, 4 VILL. ENVrrL. L.J. 417 (1993).
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II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Purposes and Construction of CERCLA

Despite a legislative history that has been described as
"shrouded with mystery,"2 1 courts have consistently identified two
essential goals that Congress intended to achieve by enacting CERCLA. 22 First, Congress intended for the federal government to
have the necessary tools for prompt and effective responses to the
problems caused by hazardous wastes. 23 Second, Congress intended for those responsible for the damages and problems caused
by hazardous wastes to bear the costs associated with their
24
cleanup.
Both of these congressional goals are remedial in nature.
Courts have determined that the best way to effectuate these remedial goals and to accomplish Congress' objectives is to interpret
25
CERCLA broadly and liberally.
B.

Actions for Contribution Under CERCLA

Prior to the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, most courts followed the common law rule that permitted liable parties to seek
contribution for CERCLA damages from other liable or potentially
21. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H.
1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history."). A commentator
has noted that "[a]lthough Congress... worked on 'Superfund' . .. for over three
years, the actual bill which became law had virtually no legislative history at all."
Frank P. Grad, A Legislative Histoiy of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1 (1982).
22. See, e.g.,
Dedham Water, 805 F.2d at 1081.
23. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
24. Id. Courts have also recognized the additional objectives of: (1) encouraging the use of maximum care and responsibility when handling hazardous
wastes, (2) encouraging the voluntary cleanup of hazardous waste spills, and (3)
encouraging the early reporting of CERCLA violations. See, e.g., Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (E.D.
Pa. 1987).
25. Dedham Water, 805 F.2d at 1081 (citing United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.
Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985)); Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112. The Reilly Tar
court stated that "[t)he statute should not be narrowly interpreted to frustrate the
government's ability to respond promptly and effectively. . ." to hazardous waste
emergencies. Id. See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("We will not interpret [a provision of CERCLA] in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the absence of a specific congressional inten-

tion otherwise."); 3A NoRMAN

J.

SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION, § 71.02 (5th ed. 1992)("[Tjhe courts [are] committed to giv[ing]
statutes which are enacted for the protection and preservation of public health an
extremely liberal construction in order to accomplish and maximize their beneficent objectives.").
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liable parties. 26 To clarify its intentions, though, Congress
amended CERCLA and codified the common law rule at section
113(f)(1).27 Section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA clearly provides PRPs
with a right to contribution from other PRPs.28

To prevail in an action for contribution under CERCLA,
a plaintiff must satisfy four requirements: (1) the site where the
hazardous substances are or were contained must be a "facility" as
defined by the statute; 2 9 (2) a "release" 30 or threatened release of a
"hazardous substance" 3 1 occurred at the facility; (3) the release or
26. See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del.

1989) (third party complaints filed against State of Delaware); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 222-30 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (ruling that Congress presumed that courts would recognize right to contribution).
27. Kelley ex rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Arco Indus. Corp.,
739 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1990). The Kelley court noted that section
113(f) (1) of CERCLA "codifie[dl the principle developed under federal common
law that contribution should only be obtained from parties liable under the governing law." Id. (citing Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F.
Supp. 651, 654 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1985)).
28. For the text of section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, see supra note 12.
29. CERCLA defines a "facility" as
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well,
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
30. CERCLA defines a "release" as
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers,
and any other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or
pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in
exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim
which such persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B)
emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source,
byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those
terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et
seq.], if such release is subject to requirements with respect to financial
protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 2210], or, for the purposes of section
9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source byproduct, or special nuclear material from any processing site designated
under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal
application of fertilizer.
Id. § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
31. CERCLA defines a "hazardous substance" as
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321 (b) (2) (A) of title
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste hay-
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threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur "response"3 2 costs
that were necessary and consistent with the National Contingency
Plan;3 3 and (4) the potentially liable person falls within one of the
four classes of persons subject to liability under section 107(a) of
CERCLA.3 4 Therefore, past and present owners and operators, parties who arranged for disposal, and transporters can each be required to contribute to the response costs incurred in a CERCLA
35
claim.
To avoid liability, a party from whom contribution is sought
can refute, in its pleadings and at trial, the opposing party's assertions of the above requirements. 36 In addition, CERCLA enumer-

ing the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any
waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any
toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous
air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.
7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture
with respect to which the administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 15. The term does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed
or designated as a hazardous substance Under subparagraphs (A)
through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas,
natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel
(or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
Id. § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
32. For CERCLA's definition of "response," see supra note 9.
33. For the contents of the "National Contingency Plan," see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (d) (2).
34. 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1358
(9th Cir. 1990)(citing Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917 (1991)).
For the text of section 107(a) of CERCLA, see supra note 11.
35. SeeCERCLA § 107 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For the text of section 107(a),
see supra note 11.
36. See generally Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1355.
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ates several affirmative defenses to avoid liability.3 7 However, these

38
defenses are available only in limited situations.
If a court determines that contribution can be obtained from a
party, the court must next determine how the damages are to be
apportioned among the parties. Congress did not provide specific
factors for courts to utilize in making this determination. Rather,
the legislative history of the 1986 amendments to CERCLA merely
states that courts are to take "relevant equitable considerations into
account."3 9 However, Congress did label the "Gore Factors" as relevant criteria that courts may consider when deciding whether to
grant apportionment and when deciding how to apportion cleanup
costs among responsible parties. 40 Even so, a court may use other
37. CERCLA's affirmative defenses are set forth in section 107(b), which pro-

vides as follows:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(1) an act of God;

(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with
the defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises
from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier
by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence

that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he
took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts
or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
38. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 107879 (1st Cir. 1986).
39. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 19, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3042.
40. The "Gore Factors" are:
(1) the amount of hazardous substances involved;
(2) the degree of toxicity or hazard of the materials involved;
(3) the degree of involvement by parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the substances;
(4) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the substances involved;
(5) and the degree of cooperation of the parties with government officials to prevent any harm to public health or the environment.
Id. (citing United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill.
1984)). The "Gore Factors" were part of an unsuccessful amendment to CERCLA
advocating a moderate approach toward joint and several liability. Environmental
Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Ensco, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1992).
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equitable factors in addition to or instead of the "Gore Factors," as
the "Gore Factors" are neither "exhaustive nor exclusive."41
C.

Claims under Section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA

A party may be liable under section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA for
the costs of cleaning up a contaminated facility if, "at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance [the party] owned or operated
[the] facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of."42 Therefore, there are three prerequisites to liability under section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA: (1) the potentially liable party must be
a past or present owner or operator (2) of a facility (3) when hazardous wastes were disposed at the facility.
The determination of who are past and present owners is fairly
straight-forward and will not be addressed in this Note. 43 On the
other hand, the determination of who are past and present operators, especially when the potentially liable party is an excavator or
property developer, can be quite complicated and, therefore, will
be analyzed in depth.
44
In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
the past
owner of a contaminated wood treatment plant, Edward Hines
Lumber Co. ("Hines"), sought contribution under section
113(f) (1) of CERCLA from the entity that designed and built a portion of the Hines plant, Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc. ("Osmose"),
for the costs Hines incurred to decontaminate the site of its wood
treatment plant. 45 Hines submitted that because Osmose had con-

structed a portion of the Hines plant and had maintained a contin46
uing relationship with Hines after it completed construction,
41. Ensco, 969 F.2d at 509. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d
1192, 1206 (2d Cir. 1992)(financial resources of parties involved can be considered in allocation process); Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 771 F. Supp.
1406, 1426 (D. Md. 1991)(benefits received by parties from contaminating activities and knowledge and/or acquiescence of parties in contaminating activities considered by court for allocation purposes).
42. CERCLA § 107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2).
43. For an analysis of the liability of hazardous waste facility owners, see David
A. Rich, Comment, Pe sonal Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of
JERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 643, 664-68 (1986).
44. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
45. Id. at 156. The plant constructed by Osmose contained a "closed-loop"
system designed to prevent any toxic chemicals from escaping into the environment. It was built on a concrete platform so as to trap any chemicals that might
escape from the system before they reached the soil. Id.
Hines operated the plant from 1976 to 1978, when it sold the plant to MidSouth Wood Products, Inc. Id.
46. Id. Osmose (1) supplied Hines with chromated copper arsenate, the
chemical that Hines used to treat wood in the system designed and built by Os-
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Osmose was an operator of Hines' plant and was, therefore, re47
quired to contribute to the cleanup costs of the plant.

The Seventh Circuit, after noting that CERCLA did not define
the term "operator," analyzed Osmose's relationship with Hines
48
under traditional common law concepts of business relationships.
The court determined that Osmose's status with Hines was akin to
that of an independent contractor 49 and not that of a joint venturer. 50 Thus, as an independent contractor, Osmose was unable to
exert the requisite control to be considered an operator of Hines'
plant. 5 1 Therefore, the court held that Osmose could not be held
mose, (2) trained Hines' employees to operate the wood treatment machinery, (3)
licensed Hines to use the Osmose trademark for treated wood and (4) was able to
maintain the "Osmose Standards" at the Hines plant through its right to inspect
Hines' operations and quality control standards. Id.
47. Id. at 157. Hines maintained that these facts demonstrated that Osmose
exerted a significant amount of control over Hines' operations and that Osmose
could, therefore, be required to contribute to the cleanup costs. Id.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan has
noted that "[t]he most commonly adopted yardstick for determining whether a
party is an .. .operator under CERCLA is the degree of control that party [was]
able to exert over the activity [that] caus[ed] the pollution." CPC Int'l, Inc. v.
Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 788 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
48. Hines, 861 F.2d at 157 (citing Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. SIpp. 1484,
1488-89 (D. Colo. 1985)). The Hines court reasoned that the sponsoring legislators anticipated courts doing this. Id.
In endeavoring to define Osmose's role, the court considered the distinction
between a co-venturer and an independent contractor. Id. at 157-58. At common
law, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the independent
contractor's torts. Id. at 157. However, under CERCLA, the employer of an independent contractor, not the independent contractor, is liable for any cleanup
costs caused by the independent contractor if the independent contractor is not
an operator of the employer's facility. Id.
The joint venturer classification under CERCLA, on the other hand, provides
for the common law division of liability between co-venturers. Id. Of course, this is
the analogy that Hines favored. Id.
49. Id. at 157-58. The Hines court noted that:
[Osmose] designed and built the plant, a turnkey operation on behalf of
Hines, which became the operator of the finished facility. Thereafter
Hines had day-to-day control, hiring employees, deciding how much to
produce, where to sell it and at what price. Osmose hovered in the background, concerned about the quality of the finished product, which
could affect its reputation, but did not interfere with operational decisions. So Hines was the operator of the plant as well as its owner, Osmose
the independent construction contractor.
Id. at 158.
50. Id. The Seventh Circuit determined that at least three elements of the
common law definition of joint venturer were missing from the relationship between Osmose and Hines. Id. There was no willingness to be joint venturers, no
shared control, and no division of profits. Id. (citing Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St.
Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 1988)). In addition, the
contract stated that Osmose was not a joint venturer with Hines. Id.
51. Id.
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liable under section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA because Osmose was not
52
an operator of the Hines plant.

Even when a court determines that a party is an operator, it
cannot hold that party liable unless the court also determines that a
disposal 53 of a hazardous substance occurred while that party was
operating the facility. 54 Courts have liberally construed the two

terms subject to interpretation in this provision, "disposal" and "fa55
cility," to promote the broad and remedial purposes of CERCLA.
For example, in Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas,
Inc.,5 6 the Fifth Circuit extended the definition of disposal to include situations "when hazardous materials are moved, dispersed,
57
or released during landfill excavations and fillings."
The Fourth Circuit likewise extended the definition of a facility
when it determined that the portion of a property in and around
underground storage tanks was a facility in Nurad, Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons Co. 58 However, in Nurad, the former tenants of the
52. Hines, 861 F.2d at 158. The court also refused to develop a new business
classification into which Osmose could have been fit to find it liable. Id. The court
believed that such an effort would have made the law less functional and less stable. Id.
53. CERCLA defines "disposal" as:
[Tihe discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling leaking, or placing
of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that
such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter
the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters,
including ground waters.

CERCLA § 101 (29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29).
54. CPC Int'l Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp. 783, 789 (W.D. Mich.
1989) ("An operator of a site is . . . not liable under CERCLA section 107(a) (2)
unless, during the time of [its] tenure as owner-operator, a disposal of hazardous
substances at the site occurred.").
For CERCLA's definition of "facility," see supra note 29.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 622 (D.N.H.
1988) ("[A] 'facility' is any site where a hazardous substance is located."); CPC Int'l
Inc., 731 F. Supp. at 783 (unchecked spread of contaminated groundwater constitutes "disposal"). But see Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F.
Supp. 984 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (passive migration of hazardous wastes does not constitute disposal absent affirmative act or negligent omission by owner).
56. 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
57. Id. at 1573. In Tanglewood, purchasers of subdivision lots sought damages
under CERCLA from the developers of the subdivision. Id. at 1571. The developers had filled in and graded creosote pools left on the property from the prior
owner, a wood treatment facility. Id. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the developers'
contention that the provisions of CERCLA could only be used against the party
that caused the hazardous substances to be on the site. Id. at 1572. The court held
that there could be more than one disposal of the same hazardous substances at a
site, and that the developers' actions could be considered a disposal of hazardous
substances. Id. at 1573.
58. 966 F.2d at 842-43. The Fourth Circuit based its determination on CERCLA's broad definition of "facility," which includes "any site or area where a haz-
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property could not be held liable as operators of the facility because
the former tenants never exercised control over the underground
59
storage tanks which were the sources of the hazardous wastes.
D.

Claims Under Section .107(a) (4) of CERCLA

Section 107(a) (4) of CERCLA imposes liability on a transporter of hazardous wastes if there was a release or a threatened
release of a hazardous substance and the party transported 6° the
hazardous wastes to one of four destinations: (1) a disposal facility,
(2) a treatment facility, (3) an incineration vessel, or (4) a site selected by the transporter. 6' This Note will analyze only liability that
arises when a transporter transports hazardous wastes to a site selected by the transporter.
ardous substance has . . . come to be located." Id. at 842 (quoting CERCLA
§ 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)).
59. Id. at 843. The tenants' lease agreements did not extend to the underground storage tanks. Id. at 842. Furthermore, the court deemed it unreasonable
to assume that the tenants possessed implicit authority to control the tanks. Id. at
843.
This determination is consistent with CERCLA's goal of placing "accountability in the hands of those capable of abating further environmental harm." Id. For
a discussion of the broad remedial goals of CERCLA, see supra notes 21-25 and
accompanying text.
60. CERCLA defines "transport" or "transportation" as
the movement of a hazardous substance by any mode, including pipeline
(as defined in the Pipeline Safety Act), and in the case of a hazardous
substance which has been accepted for transportation by a common or
contract carrier, the term "transport" or "transportation" shall include
any stoppage in transit which is temporary, incidental to the transportation movement, and at the ordinary operating convenience of a common
or contract carrier, and any such stoppage shall be considered as a continuity of movement and not as the storage of a hazardous substance.
CERCLA § 101(26), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(26).
61. Id. § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4); see alsoJersey City Redevelopment
Auth. v. PPG Indus., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,364, 20,366 (D.N.J.
1987)(listing only first, second and fourth destinations). Also, courts have construed the phrase "selected by such person" in section 107(a) (4) of CERCLA as
modifying all four destinations - disposal facilities, treatment facilities, incineration vessels and sites. See, e.g., United States v. Western Processing Co., 756 F.
Supp. 1416, 1420 (W.D. Wash. 1991). But see Alice Theresa Valder, Note, The Erroneous Site Selection Requirementfor Arrangerand TransporterLiability Under CERCLA, 91
COLUM L. REv. 2074, 2085-96 (1991)(arguing that such interpretations frustrate
congressional intent). As this distinction is not determinative in Kaiser, it will not
be addressed in this Note.
In Tanglewood, the Fifth Circuit determined that a developer who spread contaminated soil that was previously concentrated in a specific area of a property to
areas throughout the property could be held liable under section 107(a) (4) of
CERCLA as a transporter. Tanglewood, 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the Tanglewood court did not provide any rationale for its holding, nor did it
specify to which of the four destinations the hazardous substance was taken. See id.
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CERCLA does not define the phrase "to a site selected by the
transporter," nor have any cases discussed its meaning. 62 To provide some guidance in interpreting the phrase this Note examines a
case in which the interpretation of this phrase was influential in
finding liability under section 107(a) (4) of CERCLA. Danella Southwest, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. 63 is such a case. In Danella, a
regional telephone company hired a construction contractor to excavate, remove dirt, and lay cables.M The construction contractor
accepted an offer by the lessee of an abandoned gas station to
dump the displaced soil from the job site at the gas station. 6 5 The
contractor transported the excavated earth to the abandoned gas
station. 66 After the contractor completed most of the excavation
and transportation of the soil, the contractor learned that the soil
was contaminated with dioxins. 67 The Danella court held that the
contractor could be held liable as a transporter of the hazardous
substances because it selected the site where the hazardous sub68
stances were taken.
62. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1343.
63. 775 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd without op., 978 F.2d 1263 (8th
Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 1230. It was the construction contractor's responsibility to select the
site where the excavated earth was to be disposed of. Id. at 1231.
65. Id. While an agent
missioner if there were any
man intervened and offered
doned gasoline station that

for the contractor was asking the city's building comavailable sites to dump the excavated earth, another
to allow the contractor to dump the earth at the abanhe leased. Id.

66. Id.
67. Danella, 775 F. Supp. at 1231. Prior to discovering the contamination,
there was no reason for the contractor to suspect that the soil was contaminated
,ith dioxins. Id. at 1234. This was true despite the fact that city officials were
aware that the site was contaminated, because they neglected to tell the contractor
this fact. Id.
68. Id, at 1234. Although the Danella court determined that the contractor
was a PRP, it refused to impose liability on the contractor. Id. The court based its
determination on six considerations. Id. The considerations that swayed the
Danella court were:
First, [the contractor] did the job it was contracted to do in a safe, professional, and workmanlike manner .... Second, there was no reason for
[the contractor] to suspect that the dirt underneath [the site] was contaminated by dioxin. . . . Third, [the contractor] was responsible for
checking with local utilities to ascertain the locations of buried pipes and
cables along the excavation route ....
Fourth, [the hiring party] drafted
and submitted the application for the excavation permit.... Fifth, [the
hiring party] was notified periodically by the EPA and [local authorities]
of confirmed dioxin sites in the ... area.... [And] sixth, [the contractor]
did not exacerbate the problem after it learned of the dioxin
contamination.
Id. at 1234-35.
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Therefore, according to the Danella court, when a party contracts with another party for the latter to receive materials, under
CERCLA the first party selects the site where the materials are to be
transported, and thus is exposed to potential liability. However, as
Kaiser illustrates, the facts and circumstances of a case do not always
afford such a clear determination as to which party selects the site
where hazardous wastes are transported. 69
E.

Indemnification and CERCLA

Section 107 (e) of CERCLA authorizes PRPs to enter into indemnification agreements to allocate financial responsibility for
cleanup costs.7 0 However, the apparent inconsistency between the

first two sentences of section 107(e) (1) has caused courts to differ
with regard to the question of with whom PRPs may enter into indemnification agreements. 7' A minority of courts have held that
indemnification agreements are valid only against non-PRPs (for
example, insurance carriers). 72 However, a vast majority of courts
have held that indemnification agreements among PRPs and between PRPs and non-PRPs are valid. 73
For example, in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,74 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not prohibit PRPs from contractually allocating financial responsibility for
69. For a discussion of the facts and circumstances of Kaiser, see infra notes
78-89 and accompanying text.
70. The statute provides:
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat
of release under this section, to any other person the liability imposed
under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to
insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any
liability under this section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph
(1) of this subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or any other person subject to liability under this section, or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any
person.
CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e).
71. The first sentence seems to prohibit allocation of responsibility for CERCLA liability and the second sentence seems to permit it. Danella, 775 F. Supp. at

1240.
72. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D.
Mich. 1991).
73. See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 959 F.2d
126 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied and op. amended and superseded on other grounds, 973 F.2d
688 (9th Cir. 1992); Danella, 775 F. Supp. at 1227.
74. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
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cleanup costs between themselves.75 The court stressed that its interpretation did not affect the underlying statutory liability. Rather,
the interpretation only affected those "who ultimately pa[id] that
liability." 76 The Mardan court thus considered apportionment
agreements among PRPs to be "essentially tangential to the en77
forcement of CERCLA's liability provisions."
This Note assumes that the majority rule, allowing PRPs to
enter into indemnification agreements with both other PRPs and
non-PRPs, is applicable for purposes of its analysis.
III.

KAIsER ALUMINUM &

rHEMICAL CORP

V.

CA TELL

US

DEVELOPMENT Co.p

In Kaiser, the City of Richmond, California ("Richmond") acquired 346 acres of land from Catellus Development Corporation's
("Catellus' ") predecessor, Santa Fe Land Improvement Company.78 Richmond hiredJames L. Ferry & Son ("Ferry") to excavate
and grade a portion of the property for a proposed housing development.7 9 While excavating, Ferry spread some of the displaced
soil over other areas within the development site.80 This soil contained paint thinner, lead, asbestos, petroleum hydrocarbons, and
other hazardous chemical compounds. 8 '
75. Id. at 1459. The Ninth Circuit did not articulate its reason for adopting
this interpretation of section 107(e), but other courts have stated that the subsection was not designed to prevent the allocation of financial responsibility among
liable parties; rather, it was designed to prevent an allocation between responsible
parties and EPA. See, e.g., Danella, 775 F. Supp. at 1240-41.
76. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459.
77. Id.
78. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1339. Santa Fe Land Improvement Company owned
the land from 1941 until 1977, when it sold it to the City of Richmond. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 4, Catellus Dev. Corp. v. James L. Ferry & Son, Inc., 976 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 92-15506) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief].
79. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1339. As part of the development project, Richmond
sold or leased 15 different parcels within the 346 acre tract to various developers.
Appellant's Opening Brief supra note 78, at 4. Richmond and the developers hired
various construction contractors to excavate and grade their properties. Id. Richmond hired Ferry in 1982. Id. at 6.
80. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1339.
81. Id. at 1339-40. These substances apparently collected on the property
when it was a shipbuilding plant during the 1940's. Id. at 1340 n.1. The Richmond Shipbuilding Corporation, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation's
predecessor, leased the property from Santa Fe Land Improvement Company and
operated the shipyard from 1941 to 1946. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note
78, at 5.
Richmond and the developers contended that subsequent occupants of the
property covered, filled with soil and graded certain areas of the property to conceal the presence of these hazardous substances. Id. These activities, Richmond
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Richmond paid for the site cleanup and then sued Catellus to
recover some of its cleanup costs. 8 2 Catellus then filed a third party

complaint against Ferry under section 113 (f) (1) of CERCLA.8 3 Catellus alleged that Ferry exacerbated the extent of the contamination and increased the cleanup costs by spreading the
contaminated soil over previously uncontaminated areas of the development site.8 4 The district court dismissed Catellus' complaint
85
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's determination that Catellus did not allege that Ferry currently owns or operates the development site,8 6 nor that Ferry arranged for disposal of
hazardous wastes at the site.8 7 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the district court's determination that Catellus did not state a
claim for which relief could be granted under sections 107(a) (1)
claimed, made it impossible for Richmond to have detected the hazardous substances by any reasonable inspection prior to acquiring the property. Id.
82. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1340. Richmond and the developers incurred millions
of dollars in response costs to clean up contaminated areas of the development
site. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 78, at 5.
Richmond also brought suit against the federal government for contribution,
because the Richmond Shipbuilding Corporation constructed ships for the United
States Navy at the site. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1340 n.2. This claim was not at issue in
the instant case. Id.
83. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1340. Catellus also sued Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corporation for contribution under CERCLA. Id. at 1340 n.3. This claim was also
not at issue in the instant case. Id. at 1340. For a discussion of contribution under
CERCLA, see supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
84. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1340. Ferry admitted that it noted that the soil was
discolored, informed Richmond of this fact, and discontinued its operations. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 78, at 6. However, Catellus alleged that Ferry
did not properly dispose of the discolored materials that it uncovered. Id. Rather,
Catellus "allege [d] that Ferry excavated the hazardous substances it had uncovered
[sic], mixed them with soil and other materials and negligently spread the resulting mixture throughout the [p]roperty,

...

releasing contaminants on the

[piroperty." Id.
85. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1340. The district court determined that Ferry was not
a person who could be held liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA, and, therefore, dismissed Catellus' complaint. Id.
86. Id. at 1341. The Eleventh Circuit determined that liability for present
owners and operators was only available against individuals or entities that owned
or operated a facility at the time a plaintiff filed its complaint. United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1046 (1991). Ferry discontinued all work at the site prior to the filing of the complaint in the instant action. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 78, at 5-6.
87. Kaiser,976 F.2d at 1341. Catellus alleged that Ferry disposed of the hazardous wastes itself by spreading the displaced soil over uncontaminated areas of
the development site. Therefore, Ferry did not arrange for any other party to dispose of the wastes. Id. For a discussion of Catellus' allegations against Ferry, see
supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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and 107(a) (3) of CERCLA.88 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed
the remainder of the district court's holding. The court held that
Catellus did state claims upon which relief could be granted under
sections 107(a) (2) and 107(a) (4) of CERCLA against Ferry. s9
IV.

A.

NARRATIvE ANALYSIS OF K4ISER

Ferry's Liability Under Section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of liability under section
107(a) (2) of CERC[A by recognizing that Ferry was not an owner
of the facility. 90 Therefore, to support a claim under section
107(a) (2) of CERCLA, Catellus' complaint had to allege that Ferry
was an operator of the facility when it or another person disposed
of hazardous substances at the development site. 9 '
Ferry argued, based on the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Hines,92 "that a contractor [could] never be liable as an operator
under [section] 107(a) (2)" of CERCLA. 93 However, the Ninth Circuit read Hines as merely reiterating the well-settled rule that to be
be able to exert control over the
liable as an operator, one must
94
cause of the contamination.
88. Kaiser,976 F.2d at 1341. For the text of sections 107(a)(1) and 107(a) (3)
of CERCLA, see supra note 11.
89. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1341-43. For the text of sections 107(a)(2) and
107(a) (4) of CERCLA, see supra note 11.
90. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1341. The facility in the instant case is the site that
Richmond hired Ferry to excavate and grade. Id. at 1341 n.5. This determination
is consistent with CERCLA's definition of a facility. For CERCLA's definition of
"facility," see supra note 29.
91. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1341. However, CERCLA does not provide much guidance with which to make this determination, as it "defines an owner or operator
as 'any person owning or operating such facility .

. . .

" Id. (quoting CERCLA

§ 101 (20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)). The Ninth Circuit deemed this circular
definition useless. See id.; see also United States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers,
Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he circularity of this definition
necessarily precludes its use as an interpretive device."). But see Hines, 861 F.2d at
156 ("The circularity strongly implies, however, that the statutory terms have their
ordinary meanings rather than unusual or technical meanings."). The Ninth Circuit, therefore, confined its analysis of the term operator to the relevant case law.
See Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1341-42.
92. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1341. For a discussion of the facts and holding of
Hines, see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
93. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1341 (emphasis in original).
94. Id. (citing Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842). Catellus contended that the construction contractor in Hines, Osmose, was held not to be in control of the facility at the
time of disposal of hazardous substances because the release of hazardous substances occurred while the plant was operating and not during Osmose's construction of the plant. Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Catellus Dev. Corp. v.James L. Ferry
& Son, Inc., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 92-15506) [hereinafter Appellant's
Reply Brief].
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The contamination in Kaiser occurred while Ferry was excavating and grading the development site. 95 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Ferry was able to exert control over the cause of the
contamination, its own excavating activities, and thus could be con96
sidered an operator of the facility.

The Ninth Circuit next determined that Ferry had disposed of
hazardous substances. 97 The court based this decision on its determination that spreading contaminated soil throughout a property
could constitute a disposal of hazardous substances. 98 The court
reasoned that by not limiting a "disposal" to the initial introduction
of hazardous substances to a property, it was acting in accordance
with CERCLA's broad remedial goals. 99 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
held that Ferry could be held liable under section 107(a) (2) of
CERCLA because it operated the facility when it disposed of hazardous substances at the facility. 1°°
B.

Ferry's Liability Under Section 107(a) (4) of CERCLA

The Ninth Circuit determined that in order for Catellus to be
able to obtain contribution from Ferry under section 107(a)(4),
Catellus had to allege that Ferry both accepted a hazardous sub95. Kaiser,976 F.2d at 1342. Conversely, in Hines the contamination occurred
after the construction process had been completed. Id.
96. Id. At the time of disposal, Ferry was in day-to-day control of the site.
Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 94, at 7. "Thus, the disposal occurred on
Ferry's watch." Id.
97. Kaiser,976 F.2d at 1342. For CERCLA's definition of "disposal," see supra

note 53.
98. Kaiser,976 F.2d at 1342. The court followed the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the term "disposal" put forth in Tanglewood. Id. In Tanglewood, the Fifth
Circuit noted that the "definition of disposal [did] not limit disposal to a one time
occurrence - there may be other disposals when hazardous materials are moved,
dispersed, or released during... excavations and fillings." Tanglewood, 849 F.2d at
1573. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Tanglewood, see supra notes 5657.
The Fourth Circuit took this interpretation one step further by holding that a
landowner disposes of hazardous materials when he passively allows them to migrate into the environment. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 846. However, the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Nurad is in direct conflict with the decision of a district court in the
Ninth Circuit. See Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1456-57 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (general movement and migration of hazardous wastes does not constitute
disposal). As the instant case involved the active disposal of hazardous wastes, this
conflict was not addressed by the Kaiser court. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1342 n.7.
99. Kaiser,976 F.2d at 1342. The court stated that "Congress did not limit the
term to the initial introduction of hazardous material onto property. Indeed, such
a crabbed interpretation would subvert Congress's goal that parties who are responsible for contaminating property be held accountable for the cost of cleaning
it up." Id. at 1342-43.
100. Id. at 1342.
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stance for transport and selected the site where the hazardous substances were taken. 0 1 The court noted that CERCLA's definition
of "transportation" included "the movement of a hazardous substance by any mode .
"102 The court then concluded that Ferry
-.
moved hazardous substances when it excavated and graded the de03
velopment site.'
Next, the Ninth Circuit had to determine the meaning of the
phrase "to . . . sites selected by such person . . -..
"04
Ferry contended that the phrase did not include "on-site" dispersals. 105 The
court disagreed with Ferry's contention and instead noted that
there was no logical basis for liability "to hinge solely on whether
[one] move[d] hazardous substances across a recognized boundary." 10 6 The court held that liability under section 107(a) (4) of
CERCLA could be imposed upon a transporter for moving hazardous materials to uncontaminated land, whether or not the uncontaminated land was a separate parcel. 10 7 Therefore, the court

101. Id. at 1338. The Kaiser court never discussed whether Ferry took the hazardous substances to disposal or treatment facilities or to incineration vessels.
These are the other sites for which transporter liability may be imposed. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4); see also supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
102. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1343 (quoting CERCLA § 101(26), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(26)). For the text of CERCLA section 101(26), see supra note 60.
103. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1343.
104. Id. (quoting CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)).
105. Id. Ferry contended that such a dispersal did not fall within the scope of
section 107(a)(4) of CERCLA. Id. However, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
disposal in Tanglewood provided otherwise. See supra note 98.
106. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1343. CERCLA is silent on whether hazardous substances have to leave the property. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 78, at 18.
Catellus stated in its opening brief that:
[u]nder CERCLA, when hazardous substances are transported from a
contaminated corner of a piece of property to other portions of the property not yet contaminated, cleanup is required of the entire property affected. The owner as well as any other persons responsible must pay to
cleanup the contamination, including the increased cost attributable to
the spreading of previously confined contamination.
Id.

This determination is consistent with CERCLA's broad remedial goal of imposing liability on those persons responsible for the damages. Kaiser,976 F.2d at
1343 (citing H.R. REp. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6136 ("Congress intended to impose liability on those parties
who 'caused or contributed to a release or threatened release of hazardous
waste.' ")).

107. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1343. The Ninth Circuit based its holding on the fact
that whether or not hazardous substances were taken to another property did not
change the fact that contamination had spread. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

19

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 7
200

VILLANovA ENVRONMENTAL LAwJouRNAL

[Vol. VI: p. 181

concluded that liability under section 107(a) (4) of CERCLA could
be imposed upon Ferry.' 0 8
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF KASERi

In Kaiser, the Ninth Circuit used the "broad remedial goals of
CERCLA" as the cornerstones of its holdings.' 0 9 The court held
that a construction contractor, hired to excavate and grade a development site, could be held liable under section 107(a) (2) of CERCIA as an operator of a facility and under section 107(a) (4) of
CERCLA as a transporter of hazardous wastes for inadvertently
spreading contaminated soil from one portion of a development
site to areas throughout the site. 10
In holding that Ferry could be held liable as an operator of a
facility, the Ninth Circuit properly clarified the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Hines."' In Hines, the Seventh Circuit held that the
owner of a facility where hazardous substances were disposed could2
not seek contribution from an alleged operator of the facility."
The Ninth Circuit properly interpreted this holding not to mean
that operators could never be held liable for contribution under
CERCLA, but rather that the party from whom contribution was
13
sought in Hines was not an operator of the facility.'
The court also properly distinguished the amount of control
that Ferry was able to exert over the development site from the
amount of control that Osmose was able to exert over Hines' plant.
In Kaiser, "Ferry performed excavation, dredging, filling, grading
and other construction and demolition" at the site during the time
of contamination. 1 4 In Hines, however, Osmose exerted control
over the Hines plant only while it constructed the plant and not
108. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit never made a determination that Ferry
selected the site where the hazardous substances were disposed. See id. For criti-

cism of this aspect of the Ninth Circuit's holding, see text accompanying infra
notes 120-121.
109. See Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1340-43. For a discussion of CERCLA's broad remedial goals, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
110. See Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1341-43. For a discussion of the facts and holding
of Kaiser, see supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
111. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's clarification of the holding in
Hines, see supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
112. Hines, 861 F.2d at 158. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Hines,
see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
113. But see Hines, 861 F.2d at 157 ("The statute does not fix liability on slipshod architects, clumsy engineers, poor construction contractors, or negligent suppliers of on-the-job training - and the fact that [an entity] might [be] all four
rolled into one does not change matters.").
114. Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1342 n.6.
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when the plant's operation caused the contamination." 5 Thus, sufficient facts were alleged to determine that Ferry exerted significant
control over the development site, and could be considered an
operator.
However, to hold that Ferry could be held liable under section
107(a)(2) of CERCLA, the Ninth Circuit also had to determine
whether the development site that Ferry excavated was a "facility"
and whether Ferry disposed of "hazardous wastes" there. 1 6 The
Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state that the development site was a
facility. However, such a determination is implicit in its holding
that Ferry could be held liable under section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA. This determination is also consistent with CERCLA's expansive definition of "facility," which includes "any site or area where a
hazardous substance has . . .come to be located.""

7

The Ninth Circuit, relying primarily on CERCLA's broad remedial powers, further determined that there had been a "disposal" of
"hazardous wastes" when Ferry excavated the contaminated soil.'18
The court correctly reasoned that a distinction limiting "disposals"
to transfers from one property to another property would be illogical as well as inconsistent with Congress' goal of making those persons who cause damages at hazardous waste sites pay for their
cleanup.'" 9 In addition, Congress' goal of protecting the public
and the environment from the dangers of hazardous waste sites
would certainly not be furthered if persons could not be held liable
for spreading hazardous wastes from one area of their property to
another.
The Ninth Circuit noted the absence of a definition of the
phrase "to ...sites selected by such person . . ." when it considered

whether Ferry could also be held liable as a transporter of hazardotis wastes. 120 However, the court did nothing to clarify the meaning of this phrase when it held that Ferry could also be held liable
as a transporter. The court merely determined that this phrase

115. Id. at 1342.
116. For a summary of the prerequisites to liability under section 107(a) (2) of
CERCLA, see text accompanying supra note 42. For the text of section 107(a) (2)
of CERCLA, see supra note 11.
117. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842 (quoting CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601

(9)).
118. See Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1342.
119. See id. at 1342-43.
120. Id. at 1343.
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could apply to sites within as well as outside of the property,just like
1 21
the term disposal could.
It is true that Ferry transported hazardous substances to a site
within the property, but that does not necessarily mean that the site
within the property was a site selected by Ferry, as the statute requires. Indeed, the facts of the case support the opposite conclusion. Inherent in a contract to excavate and grade property is a
determination by the hiring party that the excavated earth be used
for grading purposes. Therefore, the hiring party is telling the contractor to excavate the earth and move it to areas of the property in
need of grading. Under this type of arrangement, it is not possible
to say that the contractor selects the site where the excavated earth
is to be placed. Even though the contractor probably makes the
determination as to which portions of the property require the
grading, it is the hiring party who is telling the contractor where to
deposit the displaced soil.
The only plausible basis for the Ninth Circuit's determination
that Ferry selected the site where the hazardous substances were
disposed is the broad remedial goals of CERCLA. However, this
result is far in excess of the scope intended by Congress and illogical in its practical business applications.
To hold a construction contractor, hired to excavate and grade
a development site, potentially liable for contribution under CERCIA as a person who transported hazardous materials to a site of
his choosing is inconsistent with well settled theories of liability.
The implications of this holding have the potential to be far-reaching and disastrous to the construction industry. Now contractors
will never agree to excavate and grade a property without first having soil samples taken to determine potential toxicity levels. These
costs will have to be passed on to developers. Therefore, the development companies who hire contractors to excavate and grade
land will have to pay higher fees for these services in the future.
Thus, allowing development companies to seek contribution from
contractors in these circumstances merely defers the amount that
the development company should pay in response costs until the
development company has to pay its next excavation fee.
Alternatively, contractors can affirmatively seek to avoid pecuniary liability. The two most readily available methods through
121. See id. "There is no logical basis for a defendant's liability as a 'transporter' . . . to hinge solely on whether he moves hazardous substances across a
recognized property boundary." Id.
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which a contractor can avoid paying damages in these circum22
stances are indemnification agreements and insurance.
Insurance is a standard alternative to bearing the risk of most
substantial liabilities. However, due to the exorbitant liability
amounts that may be imposed under CERCLA and the fact that
even careful contractors are susceptible to liability, insurance may
1 23
very well be difficult or even impossible to obtain.
CERCLA explicitly permits parties to enter into indemnification agreements. 24 However, the statute does not allow an indemnification agreement to transfer statutory liability to the
indemnifying party.1 2 5 Thus, an indemnification agreement is of
value to a contractor only if the hiring party is able to satisfy the
liability subject to the agreement. Contractors would, therefore, be
well served by requiring hiring parties to post a bond to cover their
26
potential indemnification obligations.1
VI.

IMPACT

The broad remedial goals of CERCLA are important. They
serve as an excellent barometer through which courts can gauge
the probable effects of their holdings to ensure that they are acting
in accordance with Congressional intent. However, courts cannot
get caught up in the frenzy of expanding interpretations and remedial goals. When this happens, common sense seems to go by the
27
wayside. 1
After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kaiser, the only viable options for innocent contractors to avoid CERCLA liability are
through indemnification agreements with developers and by passing on the risks of self-insurance and the costs of field testing to
developers. However, both of these alternatives only bring us
around full-circle to where we started. They both shift the costs of
122. Edmund B. Frost, CERCLA for the Contractor,in HAZAR-DOus WASTE DispoSAL AND UNDERGROUND

CONSTRUCTION LAW § 9.16 (Robert F. Cushman & Bruce

W. Ficken eds., 1987).
123. Id. For a comprehensive discussion of insurance issues facing hazardous
waste contractors, see Lynne M. Miller & MichaelJ. Murphy, Insuring and Assessing
Hazardous Waste Contractors, in HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL AND UNDERGROUND
CONSTRUCTION LAW §§ 12.1-.14 (Robert F. Cushman & Bruce W. Ficken eds., 1987
& Supp. 1992).
124. See CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e).
125. See id.

126. Frost, supra note 122, § 9.16.
127. "[Llaws such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to logical
limits. A court's job is to find and enforce stopping points.. . ." Edward Hines
Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988).
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cleanup back to the developers. Therefore, the major impact of the
Kaiser decision will be to keep attorneys busy drafting indemnification agreements and to provide a potential windfall to the contractor who never strikes hazardous wastes, because he will have been
compensated by developers for the risk he takes every time he excavates and grades a property. More importantly, this decision will
have little or no beneficial impact on protecting the public and the
environment from the dangers posed by hazardous waste sites,
which is, after all, the reason that Congress enacted CERCLA in the
first place.
Brian I. Sopinsky
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